"You wore blue" "I wore white" "It was day" "It was night" "Ah yes, I remember it well…" from the song "I Remember It Well" from Gigi
In the film Gigi, an elderly man recounts a long ago love affair. What is remarkable about his description of the event is not only the huge number of details he apparently misremembers but also the confidence with which he continues to produce more misrecollections.
Research in cognitive aging has long recognized that older adults are more susceptible to false memories --both 'remembering' events that never occurred and misremembering events that did occur --than are younger adults (for general reviews, see Dodson, Koutstaal, & Schacter, 2000; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Roediger, 1996; Schacter, Koutstaal, & Norman, 1997) . Currently, the prevailing account for this susceptibility is that older adults have greater difficulty recollecting or using source information --specific item information about an event, such as when and where it occurred (e.g., Balota, Dolan, & Duchek, 2000; Dodson & Schacter, 2002; Johnson, Hashtroudi, & Lindsay, 1993; Memon, Bartlett, Rose & Gray, 2003; Schacter, Norman, & Koutstaal, 1998) . Without recollecting source information, people cannot determine why a particular person or event seems familiar, and so cannot edit them out of the situation being recalled (e.g., Jacoby, 1999) . In short, this reduced recollection account asserts that failing to remember source information causes older adults' increased susceptibility to memory distortions.
We, however, are investigating a very different hypothesis about why aging is associated with increased memory distortions. We assert that independent of the elderly's overall source memory for past events they are prone to experience convincing false recollections. Thus, whereas the reduced recollection hypothesis traces the elderly's vulnerability to memory distortions to diminished use of specific source information, the false recollection account argues that older adults have a propensity to miscombine features of different events (for related binding views, see Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996; Henkel et al., 1998; Koutstaal et al., 2001; Kroll et al., 1996) . The key element of our account is that miscombined binding of features in the elderly produces false memories that are as confidently held as true memories.
We used an eyewitness suggestibility paradigm to evaluate both the reduced recollection and the false recollection hypotheses. Participants watched a video clip of a crime and then answered questions about the witnessed event. Some questions referred to details that were never actually witnessed in the video, such as that the police said, "we'll shoot!" or that the burglar had a gun. Participants then completed a source memory test which contained items that referred to events that had been either seen in the video, read in the questionnaire, both seen and read, or not encountered in the experiment (i.e., new items). Participants were clearly informed that the questionnaire referred to some events that had not occurred in the video and that they should indicate for each test item whether it had been encountered in either the "video only," "questionnaire only," "both" or "neither." After making a response, they then assessed its likely accuracy.
Many studies of eyewitness memory show that older adults are prone to claiming to have witnessed events that were only suggested to them and also tend to express higher confidence in these false memories than do younger adults (e.g., Cohen & Faulkner, 1989; Loftus, Levidow & Duensing, 1992; Mitchell, Johnson & Mather, 2003; Mueller-Johnson & Ceci, 2004) . However, as Jacoby and colleagues note, these age-related differences may simply reflect older adults'
reduced memory for what was learned just as the age-related vulnerability to retroactive and proactive interference were greatly reduced when older and younger adults were matched on degree of initial learning (Jacoby et al., 2005) . No study has attempted to identify the cause of the age-related suggestibility effect by equating correct source identification performance between younger and older adults. Moreover, given the influence of eyewitness confidence on jury decision-making there is much practical importance in determining how well younger and older adults can monitor the accuracy of their memories by assigning low confidence to suggestibility errors. Theoretically, this paradigm also allows us to distinguish between the reduced recollection and vivid false recollection hypotheses.
A critical test of these two hypotheses involves, first, equating correct source identification performance between younger and older adults. Then we can determine how likely each group is to show false memories of events that were never actually seen in the video. If the reduced recollection account is correct then equating overall source memory between younger and older adults should also equate their propensity to experience false memories. By contrast, if the false recollection account is correct then older adults should still show more memory distortions even when their source memory is equated with younger adults. However, the false recollection account makes one other important prediction. This account predicts that the elderly will generally express high confidence in the accuracy of these false memories. There are potentially enormous practical and policy implications from this last prediction because it indicates that the elderly are most likely to be incorrect when they are most confident in the accuracy of their memory.
To examine these predictions, we compared three groups of participants. We included a group of young and older adults that received the identical conditions in order to verify that our procedure and materials replicate past findings of increased false memories in older adults.
However, the central test of our predictions requires that we equate source identification performance between older and younger adults. To accomplish this, we included an additional group of young participants that received a two day delay between answering the questionnaire and receiving the final memory test in order to match their source memory with that of the older participants. Thus, why cognitive aging causes false memories hinges upon comparing performance between the older and young-delay adults.
Method

Participants
Seventy-two undergraduates (range of 17-23 years) were assigned to either the Young or the Young-Delay conditions and 36 healthy older adults (range of 60-79 years) with no known cognitive deficiencies were assigned to the Older condition. (Wechsler, 1997a; Wechsler 1997b ; scaled scores reflect an individual's performance relative to the typical score of their age range, with a scaled score of 10 corresponding to average performance)
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. The three groups did not differ on either their logical memory scaled scores, F(2,105)=1.04, or their vocabulary scaled scores, F(2, 105)=1.15. Thus, the groups were comparably representative of their age groups.
Materials and Procedure
Participants were tested individually. The stimuli, based on those used by Mitchell et al. (2003) , were presented on a 17" monitor located approximately 51 cm away from participants.
Participants watched a 5-minute video reenacting a burglary and police chase. Immediately afterwards, they answered 24 yes-no questions about the video, of which eight items contained misleading suggestions. For example, in the video the police officers did not threaten to shoot at the burglar but some participants received misinformation in the questionnaire suggesting that they had. Specifically, one misinformation questionnaire item asked, "When the police said, 'Pull over or we'll shoot! You're under arrest', did the driver pull over?". Participants who
were not misled for this item were asked, "When the police said, 'Pull over! You're under arrest,' did the driver pull over?" Questions containing misinformation were intermixed with questions that did not contain misinformation. The eight misleading suggestions were drawn from a pool of twelve critical items. The remaining four items not presented in the questionnaire were used as control (i.e., new) items in the source memory test. Three versions of the questionnaire were created to counterbalance the four new items and eight misled items so that across participants all twelve critical items served as misled items and new items. Following the questionnaire, Young and Older participants completed an unrelated spatial relations task for 10 minutes. However, to match overall memory between Young-delay and Older groups, participants in the Young-delay group departed after the questionnaire phase and returned two days later to complete the source memory test.
This final source memory test was unexpected and consisted of 32 visually-presented statements: 8 referred to events that were shown in the video only, 8 referred to events that were presented only in the questionnaire (the misled items), 8 referred to events that were shown in both the video and the questionnaire, and 8 referred to new events that were never shown (4 control items, 4 filler items). Participants were clearly informed that the questionnaire referred to some events that actually had not occurred in the video. They were told that statements on the source memory test referred to events that were experienced in one of four possible ways, corresponding to four response options, "Video Only", "Questionnaire Only", "Both Video and
Questionnaire", or "Neither Video Nor Questionnaire." They were instructed to select a response based on their own memory for the event and then to rate the likely accuracy of their response using the following scale: 50 (guessing), 60, 70, 80, 90, or 100 (certain). Next, participants were given the option of either submitting or withholding their response for scoring.
However, due to space constraints and the lack of an effect on either the source accuracy scores or the suggestibility effect these data will not be presented. Finally, participants completed the vocabulary and logical memory subtests of the WAIS-III and the Wechsler Memory scale, respectively.
Results
Matching recognition & source identification performance.
Overall, we were successful in matching recognition and source identification performance between the Older and Young-Delay groups. The top half of Table 2 presents the hit rates and false alarm rates to the studied items and new items, respectively. Hit rates and false alarm rates refer to the sum of responses of 'video,' 'questionnaire,' and 'both.' Because only the critical items were counterbalanced between appearing in the questionnaire and appearing as new items on the test, we analyzed corrected recognition rates for these items by subtracting the false alarm rate to the new items from the hit rate to the questionnaire items.
There were significant group differences in corrected recognition rates to the critical items, Figure 1 , both young-delay and older individuals incorrectly responded 'video only' to recognized questionnaire items at a significantly higher rate than they did to new items, t(35) = 2.19, p < .05, and t(33) = 4.13, p < .01, respectively. By contrast, young individuals showed no suggestibility effect and responded 'video only' to new and recognized questionnaire items at nearly identical rates, t(35)< .1. Thus, as others have observed, time-delay in younger adults and advanced age are associated with an increased vulnerability to claiming to have seen items that were only read about (e.g., Higham, 1998; Mitchell et al., 2003) .
When matched with young on source memory do older adults show a larger suggestibility effect?
We examined group differences in the magnitude of the suggestibility effect by subtracting the baseline rate of incorrectly responding 'video only' to new items from this rate to the recognized questionnaire items. An ANOVA of these difference scores revealed a significant effect of group, F(2, 103) = 6.92, MSe=.10, p<.01. Older individuals (.28) showed a significantly larger suggestibility effect than did either Young-delay (.11) or Young individuals (.00), both p's<.05 as determined by Fisher's PLSD posthoc tests. The suggestibility effect in the Young and Young-delay individuals was not significantly different from each other. In short, even after controlling for age-related differences in recognition and source memory for previously encountered items, older adults are still especially vulnerable to claiming to have seen items that had only been suggested in the questionnaire.
When matched with young on source memory are the elderly more likely to be incorrect when they are most confident?
The last prediction is that older adults are more likely than younger adults to be wrong about having seen a suggested item when they are certain about the correctness of their response.
For this evaluation, we sorted the data into three groupings based on individuals' estimates of the likely accuracy of their response: accuracy ratings of 50%/60% were labeled low-confidence, accuracy ratings of 70%/80% were labeled medium confidence, and accuracy ratings of 90%/100% were labeled high confidence. We then examined the rate at which individuals incorrectly responded 'video only' to new and recognized questionnaire items at each confidence As seen in Figure 2 , the three-way interaction reflects the fact that the three different groups show very different patterns. Young individuals show no suggestibility effect: they incorrectly respond 'video only' to the new items and questionnaire items at similar rates at all confidence levels, all t's (35)<1.38. By contrast, the young-delay individuals were significantly more likely to respond incorrectly 'video only' to the questionnaire items than to the new items, t(35)=2.53, p < .05, but only for responses that were assigned low confidence of being correct.
They showed no suggestibility effect for responses in which they were moderately or highly confident of being correct, t's(35)<.5. Interestingly, older individuals showed the exact opposite pattern as the young-delay individuals. Older adults showed a very large suggestibility effect only when they were certain about the accuracy of their response, t(33)=4.15, p<.001. Ironically, when older adults were of moderate or low confidence in the accuracy of their response, then they were more accurate and were not significantly different at responding 'video only' to the questionnaire and to the new items, t's(33)<1.81.
General Discussion
When younger and older adults were equated on their overall memory for experienced events, older adults nevertheless made more suggestibility errors in which they claimed to have seen events in a video that had only been suggested in a subsequent questionnaire. In fact, the size of the suggestibility effect (i.e., the difference in the rate of incorrectly responding 'video only' to questionnaire items and new items) was more than twice as large in older adults than in the younger comparison group (i.e., young-delay group). Strikingly, older adults only made these suggestibility errors when they were certain about the correctness of their response. By contrast, their younger, accuracy-matched counterparts only made these errors when they were uncertain about the correctness of their response. These findings are of both theoretical and practical importance.
Theoretically, we observed no support for the prevailing view that reduced memory for past events causes the age-related vulnerability to experiencing false memories since older adults made more suggestibility errors and showed the opposite confidence pattern for these errors than did their matched younger counterparts. Specifically, even though individuals in the older and young-delay groups were matched on their recognition and source memory performance for the different items, older adults were still especially vulnerable to showing false memories of having seen in the 'video only' events that in fact they had only read about in the questionnaire. This result, in conjunction with the other critical finding that older adults only made these suggestibility errors when they were highly confident about the accuracy of their response, fits the predictions of the false recollection hypothesis. Advancing age, according to this account, is associated with an increased susceptibility of miscombining features of different events (see Chalfonte & Johnson, 1996; Henkel et al., 1998; Koutstaal et al., 2001; Kroll et al., 1996; Schacter et al., 1998 for related views). However, the essential and novel component of our account is that miscombined features are sufficiently bound together that they produce phenomenal experiences that are as confidently-held as vivid true memories. It is this latter component that predicts that the elderly will primarily show false memories when they are certain about the accuracy of their memory.
Although the false recollection and reduced recollection hypotheses provide alternative explanations for the effects of cognitive aging on episodic memory, they are not exclusive accounts. Nor are they the sole explanations, as age-related memory deficits can also involve changes in the way memories are evaluated (e.g., Multhaup, 1995) . However, both accounts can explain age-related increases in source memory errors. Moreover, in many traditional recognition studies, older adults are less likely than younger adults to justify their recognition responses with 'remember' responses -via the remember/know procedure-a finding that is consistent with the reduced recollection account (e.g., Parkin & Walter, 1992 ). However, with a variety of different false memory paradigms, older adults tend to more often use the 'remember' response as a basis for their false memories than do younger adults -a result that is at odds with the reduced recollection account (e.g., Norman & Schacter, 1998; Schacter et al., 1997) . The false recollection account provides an alternative explanation for older adults' increased susceptibility to memory distortions. We assert that independent of older adults' overall memory for an event, they are prone to experiencing convincing false recollections. These false recollection responses are not caused by worse memory for an initial event since older adults made more suggestibility errors than their accuracy-matched younger counterparts, but instead we suggest that they are due to older adults' vulnerability to miscombining features from different events.
Practically, the present results have disconcerting implications for the trustworthiness of older adults' eyewitness testimony. Alarmingly, older adults showed the largest rate of suggestibility errors when they were quite certain about the accuracy of their response and no suggestibility errors when they were less confident -a pattern of behavior that is particularly worrisome given the influence of eyewitness confidence on jury decision-making. By contrast, a favorable result emerged in the performance of younger adults in the delay condition. Despite their poor memory for what they encountered, these individuals accurately assessed the reliability of their responses and assigned low confidence to the vast majority of their suggestibility errors. Overall, these results suggest that no matter how accurate older adults' true memory is for events that they actually witnessed they are still vulnerable to experiencing confidently-held false memories of events that they did not witness. Note: Hit rate and false alarm rate refer to the sum of responses of 'video only,' 'questionnaire only,' and 'both' to studied and new items, respectively. Source identification scores refer to the proportion of studied items recognized as old that are attributed to the correct source. Numbers in parentheses are standard error of the mean. 
